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Against the background of demographic decline and growing economic 
competitiveness from emerging economies, this Spotlight published in 
cooperation with the Centre for European Policy Studies looks into the 
potential of increased intra-EU labour mobility. It will examine the ‘German 
case’ on EU labour mobility. It proposes ideas on how to better foster a European 
fair deal on talent, one that would benefit the EU as a whole. It concludes with 
a proposal on how to increase the benefits of the freedom of movement. 
EU citizens’ freedom of movement across 
national borders in the European Union is one of 
its fundamental principles. Cross-border labour 
mobility of EU nationals not only promotes 
European integration and social cohesion, but 
it also boosts the overall economic potential of 
the EU. The vision of borderless mobility for EU 
citizens, which has become a legal reality in 
the EU, was designed to build an economically 
robust and free European Union. Regarding the 
working-aged population, a pool of “unbound” 
human capital has the potential to counterweight 
economic imbalances through self-determined 
mobility of jobseekers to regions in which labour 
demand cannot be met locally. An economic 
space without mobility barriers is, in theory, 
good medicine for an EU that has large variations 
in unemployment and economic performance. 
But labour mobility within the EU is responding 
slowly to market forces. According to Eurostat 
and based on the European Labour Force Survey, 
in 2012 just 6.6 million workers in the EU27 
were citizens from another EU member state. 
This equates to roughly 2% of the total working 
age population (15 to 64 year olds) and 1.3% of 
the overall population of the EU27 in 2012. These 
6.6 million intra-EU labour migrants comprised 
ca. 3% of the 15.2 million foreign citizens that 
worked in the EU27 in the same year. No matter 
which comparison you make, the conclusion 
is the same: intra-EU labour mobility remains 
an exceptional case, and has not yet become a 
bastion of the EU. The lack of intra-EU labour 
mobility has severe economic consequences. 
The European council estimated the economic 
loss due to inactiveness or unemployment of 
young people to be 153 billion euro in 2011. This 
was roughly 1.2% of EU GDP. 
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been a concern for policymakers. When EU 
mobility occurs, critics express concern 
for brain drain. When it does not occur 
enough to fill labour shortages in tune with 
business cycles, and at a scale to alleviate 
high unemployment levels in cer tain 
regions, critics express concern for brain 
waste. The aggregate ambivalence in the EU 
surrounding the fear of movement and the 
fear of non-movement must be resolved in 
social and political consensus, if EU mobility 
is to become a reality, strength and regional 
comparative advantage of the European 
Union.
Against the background of looming 
demographic decline, the baby boomers’ exit 
from European labour markets, and growing 
economic competitiveness from emerging 
economies, this Spotlight looks into the 
potential of increased intra-EU labour mobility. 
This policy brief will examine the “German 
case” on EU labour mobility, digging below 
the surface of what aggregate data suggests 
is occurring in this regard. It proposes ideas 
on how to better foster a European fair deal on 
talent, one that would benefit the EU as a whole. 
It concludes with policy recommendations on 
how to increase the potential benefits of the 
freedom of movement for both individual EU 
citizens and for the EU as a whole.
Intra-EU labour mobility:  
the German bubble?
On the surface, Germany is a magnet for 
newcomers, especially those from EU countries. 
In 2012 nearly one million non-German citizens 
(966,000 persons) migrated to Germany, a 
country of 80.5 million people, according to the 
German Federal Office for Statistics. The vast 
majority of newcomers were nationals of EU 
member states. Migration from EU countries 
to Germany consists predominately of working 
aged persons.
Yet evidence suggests that the country 
is struggling to steadily attract and 
retain international talent. Three factors 
lend evidence to the hypothesis that the 
Intra-EU labour mobility is expected to grow 
in the absence of legal barriers, driven by 
an increasingly cultural and linguistically 
versatile youth in search of unequally 
distributed, and constantly shifting life 
opportunities. Some corridors of advanced 
mobility are arising and defying the dominant 
aggregate tendency not to move to a foreign 
EU country. Yet when compared with the 
percentage of the aggregate international 
migrant population on the move, which is 
just over 3 percent of the world population, 
intra-EU mobility appears underwhelming, 
especially considering that the vast majority 
of international migrants must overcome legal 
barriers, face greater financial burdens to move, 
have fewer rights and protections upon arrival 
abroad and must often bridge vaster distances 
to live abroad. Hence unblocking the lifeline of 
intra-EU talent must go beyond the creation of 
a legal framework for free movement.
For a Union that rests on the principle of free 
movement, the EU has exhibited extremely 
contradictory ‘body language’ in making 
this concept a reality. EU member states 
have reacted to intra-EU mobility with varied 
openness in recent years. Germany began by 
limiting mobility and delaying it as much as 
regulation would allow. But the country has 
since evolved into a “willing hub” for mobile 
EU workers. The United Kingdom was a pioneer 
in opening its labour markets to intra-EU 
labour migrants. Yet it has since implemented 
rhetoric and explored policies to reverse its 
long-standing attractiveness as a destination 
for mobile EU workers, with its Prime Minister 
recently calling for mechanisms to limit EU 
mobility that is economically disadvantageous 
for countries of destination. Spain meanwhile 
has reversed its “polarity” in recent years 
regarding the flow of migrants, including 
mobile EU workers. It has gone from being a 
destination to becoming a source country for 
mobile EU labour. This has happened more or 
less involuntarily as the economic downturn, 
rather than policy has pulled and pushed vast 
population flows across Spanish borders and 
through its labour market.
Both the potential success and failure of 
enhanced intra-EU labour mobility has 
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intra-EU-mobility-boom in Germany may 
instead be a “mobility bubble”.
The first factor is the large scope of emigration 
that accompanies significant inflows: Germany 
is both pulling in newcomers and shedding a 
considerable number of international migrants 
simultaneously. According to the German 
Federal Statistics Office, in 2012 579,000 
non-Germans left the country, putting net 
migration to Germany at: 387,000 non-German 
newcomers. The country is one in extreme 
fluctuation regarding its internationally mobile 
population, and this trend has continued in 
2013 leading the German Federal Office for 
Statistics to conclude that the high volume 
of simultaneous in and out migration makes 
it unclear if immigrants plan to stay in the 
country long-term. Indeed, only a few years 
ago, Germany was a country of net emigration. 
The second factor is the national method for 
counting annual migration flows: German 
data include a significant number of persons 
that do not fit the UN international standard 
(and accepted EU terminology) for defining 
an international migrant. This is because 
the figures reported by the German Federal 
Statistics Office include persons who stay in 
the country for less than one year. If we apply 
the UN definition of “migrant” to the German 
data set, according to the Federal Office for 
Migration and Asylum, the number of migrants 
deflates to just half of total f lows of non-
nationals across German borders.
Third, are the considerable push (rather than 
pull) factors driving migration to Germany: 
In 2009 net EU migration to Germany was 
18,000 soaring to almost 100,000 in 2010, 
doubling the year after and reaching 275,000 
persons in 2012. This has occurred in parallel 
to austerity measures in many countries and 
the lifting of free labour movement barriers for 
the eight EU-accession-countries in the East. 
Unsurprisingly, the main countries of origin of 
newcomers to Germany have been Eastern and 
Southern European states.
With countries such as Ireland, Italy, and 
Spain becoming less attractive to mobile 
talent amidst uncertain economic times, 
Germany may be profiting from the “negative 
magnetism” of other countries. With significant 
wage differentials, unemployment levels and 
economic forecasts in the EU, the modest 
scope of EU mobility from Southern Europe 
to Germany demonstrates that the lifeline 
of talent in the EU is clogged. The country is 
likely in the midst of a mobility bubble.
A European Fair Deal on Talent
Europe as a whole will be the first continent to 
enter a peaceful, managed demographic decline 
around 2040. The EU must urgently develop 
strategies for fostering EU mobility and create 
a fair deal on talent within the European Union.
A “European fair deal on talent” strategy 
could bridge the divide between mobility 
opponents who fear brain drain even when idle 
talent moves away, and mobility proponents 
Net migration of
non-German citizens
to Germany 2012
Source: Destatis, 2013 © Bertelsmann Stiftung
Other Countries EU27 Countries Total
111,673
275,476
387,149
Total number of migrants, by origin:
EU27 migrants, by country:
Poland
BulgariaHungary
Italy
Greece
Spain
Portugal
Rest of EU27
Migrants
275,476
17%
25%
9%9%
8%
8%
7%
2%
15%
Romania
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future domestic talent pipeline and to combat 
unemployment. In cases where this talent is 
employed and benefitting another EU country, 
a “talent mobility stabilizer” mechanism 
could be created by EU member states in the 
short-term. Accordingly, the talent-lending 
country (that has substantially invested in 
and matured domestic talent) could receive a 
“talent investment package” to grow its future 
domestic talent pool and improve employment 
prospects at home. Such an initiative could be 
referred to as a European fair deal on talent.
The temporary talent mobility stabilizer would 
consist of an economic package administered at 
the EU level. In accordance with benchmarks, 
EU countries that are net beneficiaries of 
talent could target investment at EU countries 
that “lend” domestically grown talent to 
their neighbours, in the short-term. Such an 
economic package could be ring-fenced to 
benefit government programs, as well as a 
public private partnerships that develop the 
talent pipeline and reduce unemployment: 
such as investment in education, training, 
lifelong learning and skills matching initiatives 
(that match job seekers with employment 
opportunities). This additional investment in 
talent should not replace national spending but 
complement it, increasing the total investment 
of talent lending countries in key areas of 
growth and talent.
Such a mechanism would have to be discussed 
and developed among EU member states. This 
policy brief offers a few contours of how the 
mechanism could take shape. A European fair 
deal on talent could for example, be governed 
by indicators such as:
•	 flows of intra-EU mobility and 
specifically intra-EU labour mobility, 
•	 scope of employment of EU nationals in 
other EU countries, 
•	 overall unemployment and youth 
unemployment levels in countries 
lending talent
•	 macroeconomic growth indicators and 
projections.
The collection of benchmarks could include 
an indicator on unemployment rates among 
who warn of brain waste when talent stays 
put at the price of unemployment. It could 
amplify the benefits of brain gain and brain 
circulation. Furthermore, it could contribute 
positively to increasing the EU’s economic 
competitiveness and economic rebalancing of 
the EU. In the short-term, the core argument 
for increasing mobility is to reduce (youth) 
unemployment in the EU while at the same 
time addressing emerging labour shortages 
in other EU countries through the mobility of 
workers. Especially youth unemployment rates 
in the EU have strongly diverged following 
the global financial crisis. Whereas Germany, 
Austria and the Netherlands have relatively 
low youth unemployment rates, these rates 
have all but exploded in southern Europe. 
Youth unemployment rates (15-24 year olds) 
in Greece and Spain exceeded 50% in 2012. 
Here it is important to note that the youth 
unemployment rate has limitations as a metric 
because it doesn’t adequately consider those 
young people in education in training.
A European fair deal on talent would enable 
countries losing talent to better develop their 
Source: own representation, 2013 © Bertelsmann Stiftung
A European fair deal on talent would be composed of a short term 
Talent Mobility Stabilizer. This would be an economic package 
administered at the EU level. EU benchmarks such as EU labor mobility 
flows, youth unemployment rates and economic growth forecasts could 
provide an evidence base to govern the stabilizer. In the short term, EU 
countries that are net beneficiaries of talent could aid EU countries 
lending domestically-matured talent to their neighbors. Such an economic 
package would be earmarked to benefit measures that develop the talent 
pipeline and reduce unemployment. 
Talent Mobility Stabilizer
Talen
t Mobility Stabilizer
Small Scale
Talent Mobility
Large Scale Talent Mob
ility
OTHER
EU COUNTRIES
EXAMPLE
EU COUNTRY
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mobile EU citizens, in order to raise awareness 
among EU member states should large-
scale movements of EU citizens result in 
unemployment, rather than employment.
The talent investment package could be included 
as a component in the next multi-year portfolio 
of the EU Commission and in its corresponding 
budget during its next legislative period. Or it 
could be created as a short-term, stand-alone 
fund at the EU level and be piloted initially.
Beyond forming an evidence base for the 
“talent mobility stabilizer”, the indicators can 
improve our understanding of organically 
evolving mobility trends. Through this 
improved knowledge, existing programs 
designed to foster mobility could be fine-tuned. 
New mobility, training and skills matching 
initiatives could emerge from this evidence 
base. Currently, data on EU labour mobility 
exists, but it is not compiled and reported in a 
way that allows for easy access and evaluation. 
Additionally, skills matching mechanisms are 
currently undergoing heavy investment at 
all levels of governance. From the European, 
government driven EURES project, to local 
companies placing job adds in other EU member 
state’s media, the race to find well-functioning 
skills matching methods is underway.
Increased EU mobility is an important short-
term strategy to reducing both talent gaps 
and unemployment. Yet the EU’s demographic 
challenge will exhaust its internal human 
capital resources before mid century. In the 
medium to long-term, the ingredients for a fair 
deal on talent in Europe will shift dramatically, 
to outside its borders. As the continent builds 
a demographic “roof” on its population 
cylinder in the next two decades, and overall 
demographic decline sets in by 2040, there 
will be no way to manage a fair deal within the 
EU, and a global fair deal on talent will need 
to be developed. According to projections by 
Boston Consulting, Western Europe will need 
to add 45 million workers to its labour force 
by 2030 to satisfy future labour demand. This 
equates approximately to the current working 
population of Germany.
German experiments in 
attracting EU talent
 
Matching labour supply and labour demand 
remains a huge challenge for both the private 
and public sector. For example, a pilot project 
of the Chamber of Commerce (IHK) Suhl, 
Germany advertised 25 job offers in Spain 
and received roughly 1000 applications. Only 
11 positions were staffed from these efforts 
according to the IHK. Chambers of Commerce 
and Chambers of Crafts have successfully 
emerged as the key mediators between regions 
of high unemployment and their own talent 
shortage regions.
Some skills matching pilot projects focus on 
young jobseekers and on apprenticeships and 
traineeships. An initiative of the Chamber 
of Crafts in Frankfurt selected 43 young 
people from the Madrid region for a trainee 
scheme in collabouration with employers 
in Hessen. They provided pre-departure 
language courses in Spain and general 
schooling was offered and financed by the 
Chamber while the employers paid for on-the-
job training. The German Federal Ministry of 
Economics funded the project with 240,000 €, 
indicating government awareness of the 
challenges at hand.
At the state level, the Bundesländer (the German 
federal states) have recently developed or 
refined strategies to address labour shortages 
with a wide set of measures. For example, the 
Region Brandenburg/Berlin estimates that 
270,000 positions will go unfilled by 2015. 
And these estimates pertain to just two of 
Germany’s 16 federal states. Each Bundesland 
has developed its own strategy oriented to 
state-specific skill shortages albeit addressing 
many common challenges.
Often cited measures to ease labour shortages 
are the recognition of foreign credentials, 
attracting foreign students to study in their 
state and providing information on employment 
opportunities within their states. Bavaria 
specifically underlines targeted recruitment 
of high skilled workers abroad as one of their 
six strategies to address labour shortages even 
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(Bundesagentur für Arbeit), via their MobiPro 
initiative has devoted 139 Million Euro (between 
2013-2016) to foster European labour mobility. It 
aims to build up Germany’s labour supply and 
buffer in part an increasingly difficult old-age 
dependency ratio. The MobiPro funding is for 
persons aged 18 to 35 (in exceptional cases for 
persons up to age 40). Nevertheless, European or 
national support programs should generally not 
exclude older populations.
The need for skills matching programs is 
undeniable, not only in the short run but even 
more so in view of the demographic outlook in 
Europe. According to the Fall DIHK company 
survey almost 30% of employers have not been 
able to fill positions within the set timeframe 
of 2 months.
though they view this pillar, as a tool to thwart 
short-term needs, and only want to recruit from 
abroad when the domestic labour supply has 
been exhausted.
State and national initiatives have been evolving 
in parallel. The states of Bavaria and Hessen 
have established websites and welcome centres. 
At the same time, national online platforms 
in Germany aim to boost talent inflows from 
other EU Member States. The job-of-my-life, the 
BQ-Portal (part of the ‘Fachkräfte Offensive’), and 
make-it-in-Germany are notable initiatives at the 
national level. German companies also contribute 
significantly to supplying the platform Eures 
with job advertisements. The Federal Ministry 
of Labour and Social Affairs, in cooperation 
with the German Federal Employment Agency 
Source: own representation, 2013 © Bertelsmann Stiftung
Labor Shortage Responses at the State Level in Germany
FEDERAL STATE STRATEGY TO ADDRESS SHORTAGES
Bavaria
Baden-Württemberg
Hesse
Thuringia
North Rhine-Westphalia 
Rhineland-Palatinate
Saxony
Saxony-Anhalt
Brandenburg
Berlin
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
Hamburg
Bremen
Lower Saxony
Schleswig-Holstein
Saarland
6-pillar skilled workers strategy
Baden-Württemberg skilled workers alliance 
Hesse general plan for the availability of skilled workers
Skilled workers perspective 2020: Using the opportunities, and unlocking the potential
Attracting skilled workers! State initiative to promote the availability of skilled workers.
North Rhine-Westphalia moves into action.
Rhineland-Palatinate agreement on training and the availability of skilled workers. 
Saxony 2020 skilled workers strategy 
Skilled workers availability pact
Promoting the availability of skilled workers in Brandenburg. Training skilled workers, retaining them,
and attracting them to Brandenburg!
Industrial City Berlin 2010 -2020 master plan
Availability of skilled workers in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
Hamburg strategy for the availability of skilled workers
Skilled workers initiative of the State of Bremen
Lower Saxony pact for training and young skilled workers
“Northern Future” skilled workers initiative 
State government strategy for the availability of skilled workers (together with The Demographic Network)
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The urgency of now and 
preparing for the future
Mobility within Europe has been difficult to 
achieve to date. There are no legal barriers for 
EU citizens moving to Germany. And there 
are no legal barriers for EU talent to leave 
Germany (such as facing uncertain prospect for 
re-entry). When Europe’s periphery recovers 
from the economic crisis, Germany’s prospects 
of attracting EU talent will likely diminish 
significantly. Thus, one can expect that EU 
talent will gravitate more evenly throughout 
various talent hubs in the EU in the coming 
decades, as the baby boomers generation exit 
the labour market. 
Benchmarking and understanding what 
moves talent around the globe, and reacting 
to changes in talent flows in real time will 
become a necessity for economic well-being 
for both Germany and the EU. Therefore, the 
benchmarks suggested in this brief to govern 
a talent mobility stabilizer, could in the long-
term, grow and evolve into a universal tool for 
creating a global fair deal on talent.
Available data on talent flows suggests that 
talent hubs that can compete for high skilled 
workers will be open, multicultural cities, 
while rural or less attractive regions (countries) 
will continue to lose both the competition for 
talent along with the best and brightest of their 
home-grown population. What policymakers 
must understand is that both retaining and 
attracting talent will increasingly be mutually 
reinforcing: if you cannot attract it, you will 
increasingly not be able to retain your own 
domestic talent.
In the short-term Europe should add to its 
“toolbox” for growing and retaining talent, as 
well as matching that talent with employment 
opportunities. One way in which the EU and 
its member states can do this is by creating 
a talent mobility stabilizer and related 
benchmarking tool. The evidence base created 
as a result will provide useful insights to policy 
makers to fine-tune related talent policies. The 
ambivalence surrounding the fear of movement 
and the fear of non-movement must be resolved 
in social and political consensus, if EU mobility 
is to become a reality, strength and regional 
comparative advantage of the European Union. 
In the longer-term the EU will have to develop 
a strategy for a global fair deal on talent. It will 
have to invest in growing talent both at home 
and abroad, as well as compete for mature 
talent globally. 
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